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We have reached a stage in our society's ongoing debate over ethically 
controversial end-of-life decisions where such matters have been put up for public 
vote. A Washington State initiative to legally permit physician-assisted suicide and 
voluntary active euthanasia was defeated in November 1991 by 53% to 47%, but 
supporters, heartened by the fact that the initiative received over 701,000 votes, 
have announced plans to place similar proposals before citizens in California 
(1992) and Oregon (1994). The expectations for ultimate success rely heavily on a 
perception that such "right to die" or "death with dignity" initiatives reflect a 
strong populist sentiment. In the forums of public discussion, the voices that have 
come to the fore are those of terminally ill patients, and their families who have 
become their principal caregivers, and these stories resonate with many other 
persons who have come to see the Karen Ann Quinlans, Nancy Cruzans, and 
Janet Adkins of the past 15 years as visible symbols of what it means to die in a 
culture obsessed with the technological conquest of death. 
The common parameters of the public debate are already familiar to us from 
other contexts: the right of expanded choice is pitted against claims about the 
sanctity of human life, thereby making the political polarization of the discussion 
seem unavoidable. Nevertheless, it seems moraUy myopic to reduce the question 
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oflegalized physician-assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia only to an issue of 
the boundaries of public or state intervention in a private choice. The public policy 
issue is merely the . most visible dimension of a dialogue that in fact engages 
embedded questions of the deepest substantive significance and of ultimate 
meaning: the nature of our lives, and our selves, the meaning of dependency, the 
place of pain and suffering in life, the reality of finitude and death. 
Such issues are not really problems to be "solved" by legislative fiat or a voter 
referendum, but neither should they be bracketed out in debates over the 
legalization of euthanasia. Indeed, only by attending to such questions can we 
explain the nature of the fundamental differences of positions that emerge. In short, 
raising these questions of ultimacy will render the debate over legalized euthanasia 
more intelligible and, equally important, more honest. 
The questions of ultimacy embedded in the euthanasia debate are common 
questions of human meaning, and yet historically their most visible context of 
reflection has been within religious traditions. It is not coincidental, I would 
suggest, that there is a theological story to be about each of the symbols of modem 
dying. The decisions about treatment of Karen Ann Quinlan were shaped by the 
context of Roman Catholicism, those about Nancy Cruzan by a Methodist 
background, and Janet Adkins sought out Dr. Jack Kevorkian after consulting 
with her Unitarian minister. In very significant ways, religious themes and symbols 
have been interwoven with the fabric of public discussion about the right to die 
and legalized euthanasia. 
In the following, then, I wish to consider the religious dimensions of euthanasia 
as they bear on five embedded questions of ultimacy and meaning - control and 
empowerment, the finite self, the gifted nature of life, suffering and compassion, 
and the good death. Such themes indicate that in our care of the dying, there are 
preferable alternatives to affirm the humanity of the dying and to relieve their pain 
and suffering (the two principal arguments supporting legalized euthanasia), short 
of resorting to taking their lives. In so doing, I hope to illustrate that the issue of 
legalized euthanasia provides an illuminating way to examine the relevance of 
religious themes to moral and civic discourse in the public square. 
Religious Diversity 
It is often intimated that the moral fault-lines over euthanasia reflect a secular 
versus religious fissure. However, there is no monolithic religious position on 
euthanasia (morally or legally), and indeed the diversity of religious positions is 
rather striking. This diversity, which reflects instead the pluralism of American 
religiosity in general, is manifest at several different levels of discussion. 
The level of theological discussion displays a range of views, from a general 
prohibition of euthanasia, to a permission in exceptional cases or circumstances, to 
a permission as a matter of public policy, to even an obligatory response in cases of 
extreme suffering.! Sometimes these differences reflect a general identification 
with a particular tradition of religious ethics, but not always. While the Roman 
Catholic Church, for example, has been vigorously opposed to assisted suicide and 
legalized active euthanasia, some theologians, such as Lisa Cahill and Daniel 
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Maguire, are willing to permit euthanasia within very limited or exceptional cases, 
typically, a competent terminally ill patient who voluntarily requests euthanasia 
and for whom there is no viable alternative to relieve extreme pain and suffering.2 
Protestant theologians such as Gilbert Meilaender and Allen Verhey, meanwhile, 
argue for a conservative, prohibitory approach to euthanasia,3 despite the 
historical Protestant emphasis on freedom of personal choice. 
A similar range of positions is evident in the resolutions regarding end-of-life 
decisions adopted by "authoritative" ecclesiastical institutions. While it is the case 
that the majority of denominational resolutions in the U.S. have affirmed 
opposition to euthanasia, there are some, such as that approved in July 1991 by 
the United Church of Christ, that see the morality of euthanasia resting in an 
"individual decision" (current study documents in the United Methodist Church 
and the Presbyterian Church also seem to move in this direction), while others, 
such as in the Unitarian Universalist Assembly, are committed to seek changes in 
laws to allow for assisted suicide and active euthanasia.4 
The moral and policY weight that such resolutions carry is also open to question. 
There is, in many instances, an evident disparity in positions articulated by an 
institutionalized ecclesiastical body and those advanced by the lay members of the 
tradition. One can no more infer what the position of any particular Roman 
Catholic, or Episcopalian, Baptist, Methodist, Congregationalist, etc., on 
euthanasia will be from a denominational resolution than one can the views of any 
given professional caregiver from the official "opinions" of the American Medical 
Association or the American Nursing Association. 
Moreover, many resolutions speak primarily to an audience of the religious 
community, and only secondarily, if at all, to the public policy question. To be 
sure, resolutions that characterize euthanasia as "homicide" or "murder" have 
fairly direct implications for legal sanctions. However, even the most vehement 
denominational opposition to legalized euthanasia often will distinguish between 
the act of euthanasia and the agent that requests euthanasia. While the act may be 
forbidden, the patient may well be excused from moral and religious 
responsibility, due to the underlying circumstances of pain and suffering. 
Moreover, recommendations that an attitude of "compassion" or ''forgiveness'' be 
adopted towards the patient, rather than "punishment," also may have policy 
implications, as such language suggests a softening of a legalistic judgment in favor 
of considering extenuating circumstances. Of course, such modification of moral 
and legal judgment would not necessarily apply to a professional, such as a Dr. 
Kevorkian, who engages in a practice of assisting in suicide. 
Finally, diverse religiosity is also expressed in the private piety of individual 
patients faced with end-of-life decisions. The biblical admonition that there is "a 
time to die" provides a sense of comfort for many terminally ill patients, who 
frequently acknowledge their impending death by expressing, in effect, that their 
destiny is "in God's hands." Some patients, however, take a more active role, as 
displayed by Marjorie Wantz, a Michigan woman with a painful pelvic disease 
who asked Dr. Kevorkian to assist in her suicide: "If God won't come to me, I'm 
going to find God."5 The voices of the ill, which have played such a powerful 
public role in the debate over legalized euthanasia, are not, then, absent 
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religious conviction. 
Each of the manifestations of religious diversity suggest that it is misleading to 
portray growing public interest in assisted suicide and active euthanasia as a sign of 
a "godless" society that has lost its faith bearings. The problem is not so much loss 
of faith in a secular society, but rather the context of modem dying. We are 
rightfully concerned with where death occurs (typically in institutions experienced 
as alien and impersonal); at what age (our life expectancy has increased in this 
century from 47 to 74, but in its wake has come greater sickness and morbidity); 
the causative disease (chronic diseases - the cancers, heart problems, strokes, 
dementia - that extend the duration of the dying process); the degree of pain that 
accompanies this protracted process; and, finally, the orientation of professional 
caregivers towards curing rather than caring, meaning that patients may 
experience as part of their dying the tyranny and terror of technology. 
This modem context of dying has occasioned a theological re-thinking of 
traditional religious views and norms regarding the sanctity and the dignity of 
human life, and helps in part to explain the kinds of diversity present in religious 
discourse about euthanasia. In the midst of such diversity, nevertheless, one can 
identify some fairly common themes and unifying issues that reveal a dimension of 
ultimacy embedded in the euthanasia debate. 
Control and Empowennent 
The public debate over euthanasia continuously makes reference to ideologies 
of control and power. The greatest threat to the dignity and self-identity of 
terminally ill patients, it is argued, is the experience of "loss of control," an 
indignity that is especially assaulting because of the private and intimate nature of 
one's dying. Patients fear losing control to technologies, to professionals, to the 
state, and in some instances, to their families. (Caregivers themselves may well feel 
"controlled" by the requests of patients, or their families, or the law and lurking 
malpractice concerns, or more and more, economics and the cost of care). The 
recourse is frequently a strong moral affirmation of the responsibility to respect 
patient self-determination regarding end-of-life decisions, coupled with a quest for 
legal "empowerment" through relevant advance directives. In a very fundamental 
respect, the demand for "dignity" in dying is connected with having control over 
and being able to manage one's dying. 
The assertion of control and empowerment reveals some very paradoxical 
features at the heart of practices of care for the dying. The experience of loss of 
control has come just as the dominant traditions in medicine, the law, and ethics 
have converged to form a consensus that patients ought to have control over their 
dying. This is the point, after all, of all the legislation and case law regarding 
advance directives since Quinlan, culminating in the "Patient Self-Determination 
Act" that went into effect in December 1991, and requires all health care facilities 
receiving federal funds to inform patients about advance directive upon admission. 
There thus appears to be a profound disparity between what patients are 
experiencing in the course of their dying and what they are supposed to be 
experiencing. 
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Yet, at the same time, the very experience of illness and more fundamentally the 
process of aging-that inevitably culminates in death revealS that we are subject to 
some kind of ultimate powers beyond our control. We perhaps aspire, through our 
technology and knowledge, to a mastery of nature and the immortality of the gods, 
but we cOntinually receive reminders of our limited and finite nature. We may 
therefore experience these ultimate powers as arbitrary, as abusive, as cruel 
-because we are deprived not only of what we have but also what we wish to be 
-or as creative, nurturing, and preserving, but we cannot in any event help but 
acknowledge that any "control" we assert over our dying is limited and qualified 
with respect to these ultimate powers. 
The religious dimensions of this sense of control by an ultimate Other are 
displayed in the bedside expressions of "being in God's hands," or "letting God's 
will be done"; or, it may be stated in more formal theological affirmations 
regarding the "sovereignty" of the creator of human life over our death and destiny 
as well. This appeal to "God's hands," "will," or "sovereignty" reflects not so much 
the closure of the question at stake, but rather its context Patients, caregivers, and 
families still have choices to make,lest this dimension of ultimacy become a guise 
for fatalism. That is, it still is an intelligible question to ask whether patient choice 
for death expresses or contradicts the basic sense of powers that are beyond our 
control and ultimately sovereign. 
Another way to frame this dimension is to ask whether patients who are 
"empowered" with choices regarding end-of-life decisions also have accountability 
for the content of that choice. Does a right to choose imply that all choices 
regarding the bringing about of death are morally equal? While setting standards 
for responsible choice seems an alien idea in a pluralistic culture, a core theme in 
religious discourse about taking human life is accountability, to self and conscience, 
to others, such as family or professional religious caregivers in medicine, and to an 
ultimate Other. In evaluating proposals for legalized euthanasia, we might follow 
the suggestions of some ethicists who see in the Just War tradition formal moral 
criteria that have broad applicability to situations where the taking of human life is 
contemplated.6 The case for legalized euthanasia, I submit, may meet many of 
these criteria, but almost certainly fail the test of last resort. 
The Finite Self 
It is sometimes maintained that the fact of illness compromises personal 
autonomy, that the experience of pain and suffering disables not only the body but 
also the selfs capacities for informed decision making. Such a perception has 
historically been important to justifications of medical paternalism. As well, it 
surfaces in theological claims that a deliberate choice for death through suicide is 
rationally compromised if not entirely irrational. Yet, the paradigm case for 
voluntary euthanasia presents a patient who is fully autonomous and possesses 
sufficient decision-making capacity, notwithstanding a condition of terminal 
illness. It is evident then that an ethic of euthanasia presupposes a conception of the 
nature of the self in the face of illness and death that is somewhat contrary to 
conventional wisdom in medical and theological traditions. Since such an ethic 
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places so much stress on patient self-determination, this conception of "self' bears 
some scrutiny. 
There is little reason to dispute that some deliberate choices for death are 
carefully considered and continuously expressed. Some just as surely are not, but 
are occasioned by depression, reversals of fortune, etc. An important safeguard is 
to ensure that a patient's first words are not his or her last words: The demand for 
death, if it is an authentic expression of the desires of the self, would be reiterated 
over time. Such a view is implicit in our allowance for revocations of advance 
directives. We know the self over time can change its mind, and respecting such 
changes in this context is especially pertinent, since failure to heed a changed 
treatment preference may lead to an irrevocable mistake. 
We can also ask whether a patient's consistently expressed request to die may 
well signify a form of isolation experienced by the dying person. The exemplary 
patient of an ethic of euthanasia is a paradigm of individualism. We do not, 
however, live our lives shorn of social relationships, and it is this social dimension 
of the self that seems neglected by the stress on personal autonomy. The 
autonomous self requesting assisted suicide or euthanasia is affirming 
independence, when the character of our lives is marked by mutual dependency. 
Thus, it is imperative to ask whether the care of the dying person has somehow 
disrupted or severed the relational bonds and connectedness for the person. This is 
not to suggest that, all things considered, the wishes of a competent patient ought 
always be trumped by the interests of others. It is to contend, however, that many 
discussions of euthanasia do not consider all things. Hospitals are wonderful places 
for curative medicine, but they are not at all conducive to a humanizing experience 
of dying. 
The institutionalization of dying in our culture can be a profoundly alienating 
and isolating experience for the terminally ill. There are, however, other venues for 
care that can be more supportive of experienced social patterns of life, including 
hospice and home care. Our culture needs to be much more supportive of these 
venues, lest we drive the terminally ill to euthanasia out of a sense that they have 
been abandoned. The dying patient may be beyond the realm of technological 
cure, but our attitudes and practices must ensure that they are always within the 
realm of human care, that their pain and suffering is an occasion for compassionate 
bonding rather than social severing and isolation. 
A third aspect of the moral self pertinent to the euthanasia debate is often 
expressed in both theological and popular discourse in the metaphor of "playing 
God." A principal thrust of this slogan is to suggest that deliberate choices for death 
are an arrogant usurpation of authority regarding the manner and time of one's 
dying. It is to encroach on the dominion of the powers beyond our control that we 
experience as sovereign and ultimate. 
Doing ethics by slogan inevitably risks distortion of the issue, and the problem 
with this particular metaphor is that it appears to deprive persons of the capacity 
for responsible moral agency with respect to all end-of-life decisions. On one hand, 
the appeal to playing God seems to push in the direction of/atalism. viewing even 
the occurrence of illness and disease as manifestations of the inscrutable divine 
will. A provocative literary example of this attitude is to be found in Albert 
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Camus's The Plague, in which the priest Paneloux accepts his lethal affiiction as 
God's will and refuses to allow the physician, Dr. Rieux, to administer a potential 
inoculating serum.7 Thus, providing technological interventions that alter the 
natural course of the disease process might be rejected as a form of playing God. 
Alternatively, the concern about playing God may be expressed in vitalism, an 
attitude that requires all medical technologies, as gifts of divine grace, to be used to 
prolong life and forestall death. In this view, a decision not to provide such 
treatments is a pretentious usurpation of dominion over life and death by human 
authority. Such an attitude was displayed in the recent Minnesota case of Helga 
Wanglie, a persistently comatose, 87-year old woman whose husband refused to 
allow her physicians to disconnect the respirator because of his wife's convictions 
that "Only He who gave life has the right to take life."8 
The problem with both fatalism and vitalism is that human beings are not 
conceived as moral agents with decisionmaking capacity and responsibility. 
However, the theological concern expressed in the playing God metaphor is best 
seen as the presupposition within which we are called to exercise responsible 
agency. While human beings do not have ultimate control over life and death, we 
are accountable as stewards over our own lives and for the lives of others. 
It is, moreover, in the actions contemplated in responsible stewardship that the 
playing God theme can be a useful reminder of the constraints on our decisions. 
The point is not that we should not make choices about medical treatment at life's 
end, but rather that we should recognize such choices are made in the context of 
our finitude and fallibility. 
These inherent limitations of human nature are particular germane to public 
policy about legalized euthanasia. We have limited predictive capabilities about 
the outcomes of actions and policies that we initiate, which demands caution in 
evaluating claims either that a social practice of euthanasia will be relatively 
"clean," or that it will culminate in an ethos not dissimilar to that of Nazism. 
Similarly, however many safeguards built into a social practice to regulate and 
manage such a practice, we seldom are able to control the courses of action we 
initiate. The Dutch experience with de facto toleration of euthanasia is especially 
revealing of this point. The first governmental study of the scope of the practice 
indicated that, despite a decade-long effort to establish professional guidelines 
under which physicians would not be subject to prosecution for performing 
voluntary euthanasia, 44% of patient deaths did not meet the strict criteria for the 
practice.9 
The context for our personal and social choices, then, is that of finitude 
displayed in limited knowledge and limited control, rather than supporting 
pretensions of omniscience and omnipotence. It is also constituted by our fallibility 
and propensity for making mistakes, the magnitude of which is enormously 
heightened in a practice of euthanasia, because any mistake is irrevocable. Recent 
proposals for legalized euthanasia, as in Washington State, stipulate that the option 
of euthanasia would be made available only to patients diagnosed with a terminal 
illness, but medical professionals are the first to acknowledge that such diagnoses 
are not infallible and that the duration of terminality cannot be specified by 
imposing a rather arbitrary time frame, such as six months. 
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The pitfalls of presuming that all our technology bas brought us certainty with 
respect to the end of mortality are tragically highlighted in the story of Wanda 
Bauer, a 69-year-old Colorado woman. In July 1991, Ms. Bauer was informed by 
her physicians that she had terminal liver and pancreatic cancer. Returning home 
from a hospital stay, she asked her son to retrieve a .22 caliber pisto~ which she 
then used to take her life. An autopsy revealed that Ms. Bauer was in fact suffering 
from a serious liver infection, both treatable and non-cancerous. IO 
One could validly contend that the Bauer narrative is an aberration, and that a 
legalized practice of euthanasia could incorporate procedural safeguards 
(independent review panels, for example) to reduce diagnostic and prognostic 
mistakes to the minimum humanly possible. Yet, the need for such procedures 
concedes, in effect, the larger claim at issue here respecting human finitude and 
fallibility. Indeed, the permissive or restricted nature of the procedures proposed or 
constructed to compensate for human limitations will themselves reflect certain 
understandings of human nature. 
The Giftedness of Life 
Perspectives on euthanasia also reflect conceptions of the character of our lives. 
We may, on one hand, make claims of "ownership" over our lives and consider 
our bodies "personal property," notions which fit readily within a paradigm of 
self-determination. Yet, we also know that we are radically dependent on others 
for our very existence and for the basic conditions - air, food, clothing - of 
continued existence. 
This sense of ultimate dependency often assumes a more religious 
characterization of life as a "gift," as something of intrinsic value that we receive 
from others, and not merely instrumental value with which we can do whatever 
we please. Indeed, historically much theological objection to suicide focused on 
how such acts expressed repudiation of the divine gift of life, and therefore 
comprised a wrong, constituted as much by the sin of ingratitude as by a sense of 
unjustifiable killing. 
At first glance, "gifts" seem to have a fundamental dimension of freedom to 
them. We receive them not because of desert or work we have done (otherwise the 
gift becomes a "wage"), but by the generosity of the giver. Moreover, gifts 
frequently are made in the absence of expectations of remuneration to the giver, 
expectations that transform the gift into an inducement. 
The paradox of gifts, however, is that we also feel, sometimes very powerfully, 
that they create bonds of community with others, II and in that respect are not free. 
We feel, for example, that certain attitudes towards the giver are appropriate, such 
as gratitude and thankfulness, while others, disrespect, indifference, or ingratitude, 
are not. 
In addition, gifts seem to create a kind of moral imbalance between persons. It's 
not merely that we seem to feel the recipient should hold a certain attitude towards 
the giver, but the recipient typically feels some kind of inner imperative of 
reciprocation. That doesn't entail (at least necessarily) a tit-for-tat exchange, which 
in all likelihood would diminish the moral significance of the original gift and 
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transform the relationship into a form of trade and barter. However, the recipient 
commonly engages in some practices of response to the gift, such as the expression 
of gratefulness, which can affirm a deep bond between giver and recipient. The 
recipient may also indicate a desire to "make it up" to the giver at some future date, 
implying again that some type of reciprocity can rectify the moral imbalance. 
created by the original gift. 
Part of the nature of gifts is that they come with "no strings attached," and so 
once given, the recipient is in a practical respect free to use, transfer, or dispose of 
the gift as his or her own. Yet, this practical freedom may not correspond to a 
deeper existential reality, especially present with gifts of great value, of an 
experienced responsibility to use the gift in a manner intended by the giver. 
Indifference to the gift may itself be a form of ingratitude, and exchanging an 
unwanted gift (a tie for Christmas, for example) for something we really wanted 
may involve us in an embarrassing explanation, if not deception, should someone 
inquire how we liked the particular gift. 
Thus, our common parlance suggests dimensions in which gifts are, 
paradoxically, both free and binding. The same features, I suggest, are embedded 
in our discourse about life as a "gift." The sense of gratitude to parents, and within 
a religious community to the ultimate Giver of Life, seems a basic, natural human 
inclination. This gift, in an ultimate sense cannot be reciprocated, but we may seek 
other modes of expressing gratitude, for example, caring for our parents as they age 
and become increasingly dependent on others. 
Whether we can use our lives in a manner consistent with the intentions of the 
givers is a more complex question, yet also one of particular relevance to the ethics 
of euthanasia. We would first need to know what the intentions in giving us life 
were,12 and our parents may not have had any, or have such general intentions that 
several ways oflife could satisfy them. Very specific intentions - "You will be an 
attorney," etc. - can so limit the recipient's freedom that one's life will not be 
experienced as a gift. Similarly, while theological communities affirm the 
fundamental goodness of God's intention in creation, it may be unclear what this 
implies for the specific actions of a particular individual. 
As with many gifts we receive, our bodies age and deteriorate, and become less 
instrumentally useful to ourselves and to others. That does not necessarily mean 
either that the intrinsic value of the gift has been eroded or lost, or that a choice for 
death while in the terminal stage of illness expresses ingratitude. Indeed, in such 
contexts, patients and caregivers may talk about "giving up" the fight against 
death, which presents two quite distinct meanings. It might suggest a despondent 
resignation to one's demise, that all reasonable resorts to prolong life have (or will 
prove) futile. However, "giving up" can also express a sense of responsibility to 
return one's life and self into the hands of its ultimate Giver. On this latter 
construction, it would be vital to preserve the relational value of "giving" rather 
than "taking" life, such as through assisted suicide or euthanasia. 
Suffering and Compassion 
In addition to the argument from patient self-determination, a common 
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justification for euthanasia appeals to the pain and suffering experienced by the 
terminally ill, an appeal that converges with the strong emphasis in the moral 
tradition of medicine to relieve the pain and suffering of patients. This imperative 
seems especially appealing in a culture oriented to instantaneous technological 
gratification, and from which we demand immediate relief from the vicissitudes of 
life. In such an ethos, pain and suffering come to be looked upon as evils, perhaps 
of an absolute kind 
A set of assumptions about suffering are embedded in this argument that need to 
be challenged both culturally and theologically. A first is its too easy identification 
of "pain" with "suffering." What suffering seems to amount to is but an extreme on 
the continuum of pain; suffering is simply unbearable or uncontrollable, or 
perhaps unnecessary, pain. Surely, however, if biomedical researchers only apply 
themselves more diligently, we can develop therapies that will bring suffering 
under our mastery as well. 
Yet, we know full well from our own experience that we can feel pain but not 
suffer, and we can experience suffering without being in pain. \3 Though illness and 
disease, and especially terminal illness, can surely be an occasion for suffering, 
suffering is ultimately something more than a bio-physiological phenomenon; in 
suffering, the integrity and identity of the self is threatened or called into question. 
Such a conception of suffering tends to place it beyond the biomedical model, 
however, as something that is not susceptible to curing or fixing by one or another 
of the technological remedies at the disposal of caregivers. Suffering is in this 
respect medically and technologically incorrigible; yet, it is precisely because we 
can't medically manage suffering that its obstinate presence becomes an occasion 
to affirm the rights of the terminally ill to euthanasia. We seek to solve the problem 
of suffering by taking the life of the sufferer. 
Such an attitude suggests that the modem medical enterprise simply cannot 
accommodate suffering. It appears as an unmitigated, unredeemed evil that ranks 
along with death as the mortal enemies modem medicine seeks to conquer. 
Indeed, as the increasing public sentiment for euthanasia reveals, in some instances 
death is the lesser and preferable evil. 
This cannot fail to have its effects on the moral identity of medicine. 
Paradoxically, even though the virtue of compassion is often cited as a motivation 
for euthanasia, the failure of medicine to account for suffering renders the entire 
notion of compassion morally vacuous. For compassion means to suffer with or 
share in the sufferings of the other. Yet, such a virtue would have no moral point or 
meaning when the elimination of suffering and/or the sufferer becomes a central 
purpose of the medical ethos. 
The problem here is that modem medicine, and our technologically obsessed 
culture more generally, has simply lost sight of a central religious dimension to 
suffering, namely, the tradition of meaningful suffering. That does not mean that 
suffering is to be praised as a good, or that it is to be sought after. Dr. Rieux in The 
Plague is surely correct to contend that it is preferable to relieve suffering than to 
portray its excellence. 14 The point of this religious dimension, rather, is that even in 
the midst of such an evil, purpose and meaning can be found and ascribed. We 
cannot, then, simply consider suffering as always an unqualified evil whose 
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presence is a symbol of our failure and whose mastery is our objective. 
Historically, religious thought has pointed to three principal purposes for 
human suffering: A punitive purpose due to sinfulness; a pedagogical purpose to 
expand the character of the self; and a redemptive purpose to purify the soul. The 
former purpose should not be a consideration in the case of the terminally ill, as all 
will one day experience such a condition. However, the latter two dimensions of 
suffering can be significant for both patients and caregivers. The ordeal of suffering 
may bring knowledge and a cleansing to patients while providing an occasion for 
compassionate stewardship by others. IS 
The tradition of meaningful suffering could not be more at odds with a medical 
ethos that seeks to eradicate all suffering. The late theologian Paul Ramsey, at a 
conference on chronic illness, speculated that the purpose of modem medicine was 
to relieve the human condition o/the human condition, with "human condition" 
referring to the pain and suffering we experience as our common mortal lot. It is 
worth asking, whether in the ideological drive to eliminate suffering or, if that fails, 
eliminating the sufferer through euthanasia, we are not dehumanizing both 
professional caregivers and patients. 
The Good Death 
It is well-known that the classical meaning of the term "euthanasia" refers to an 
"easy," "painless," or "happy" death.16 In our century, however, such language has 
become very problematic, because of the association of euthanasia with the 
involuntary killing by the medical profession under the racist and eugenicist 
ideology of Nazism. Thus, the recent Washington State initiative sought to 
circumvent the terminological problem by proposing statutory language of "aid-
in-dying" rather than "assisted suicide" or "euthanasia" to describe the envisioned 
actions of physicians. 
It is nonetheless not hard to see that a conception of a good death is bound up in 
the debate over euthanasia, as displayed by the popular slogan of "death with 
dignity. "In our pursuit of technological mastery, however, we often seem to have 
foreclosed the possibility of euthanasia in the classical sense without resort to some 
lethal action. Indeed, as philosopher Margaret Pabst Battin has suggested, the 
technological imperative behind modem medicine suggests our quest is not so 
much for the good death as for "the least worst death."17 
In the voices of terminally ill patients and their relatives, three principal features 
seem to constitute the modem vision of the good or dignified death - a desire to 
die painlessly, quickly, and in one's sleep. That is perhaps not surprising, given that 
the public images of modem dying present to us persons who may be experiencing 
great pain, for a protracted period of time, during the latter stages of dementia. 
Thus, to avoid the "worst" death we may well seek alternatives such as assisted 
suicide or euthanasia to ensure a comparatively better death. 
Yet, such features perhaps are a comment not so much about death as about 
dying, about a process rather than an event. While the fear of death may well be 
still deeply embedded in our personal and collective psyches, it is possible to 
contend that our fear of dying, of a painful, protracted, technologically-managed 
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process that precedes death, has become the pre-eminent fear. Such fear likewise 
plays into support for euthanasia, which appears as an alternative to avoid a bad 
dying as well as a worst death. 
Some, perhaps much, of that fear is uneducated and can be overcome with 
more public discussion of dying and death .. Persons who feel that diagnosis of a 
terminal condition means being trapped by technology and abandonment to 
strangers need to be informed about alternative measures of empowerment, such 
as advance directives, and alternative venues of care, such as hospice. Perhaps 
much of this education can occur through the instrumentality of the Patient 
Self-Determination Act; for several reasons, however, a hospital is not the ideal 
forum for such discussions, and more sustained efforts will be needed to counter 
the prevalent taboo about death. 
In such forums, be they private, institutional, or publicly-situated, religious 
images of dying and death will be unavoidable reference points and can nourish a 
rich discourse, and it will be important to trace out the implications of such images 
and how they connect with sentiments regarding euthanasia. The religious and 
medical notion of death as "enemy," for example, sustains the relentless quest for 
technological conquest and mastery of death, and one consequence of that quest is 
increased popular support for euthanasia. 
Similarly, for many people in our culture, especially the young, death is 
perceived as "the stranger" or as "the intruder." This is attributable in large 
measure to our cultural practices of institutionalizing dying and death in hospitals 
or nursing homes, which isolate the dying person from our midst. Few more 
potent symbols could be conveyed about how dying means alienation and 
abandonment in our culture, sentiments that also can provide fertile soil for 
support of euthanasia. . 
An image of death as blessing or deliverer or even friend, by contrast, would 
support a different set of attitudes and practices in our care of the dying. We would 
perhaps be more sparing in our use of technology, and perhaps erode the stigma 
and taboo of death that is reinforced by our isolation of the dying through an 
accepting rather than adversarial relation to death. 
My general point here is that our practices of caring for the dying are connected 
with certain images of death embedded deep within our cultural ethos. These 
images are formative of understandings of a good death in our society, and, for 
better or worse, whether euthanasia is a means of achieving that kind of death. The 
retrieval of these images for public discussion is a necessary part of our quest for 
moral meaning and integrity in modem society. 
The Relevance of Religion 
The relevance of religion to public discussions over the ethics or the legalization 
of euthanasia is often disputed. It is claimed that in a pluralistic society, any 
meaningful public discourse about such matters must proceed from common and 
shared premises, whereas religious traditions provide moral frameworks of use 
only within the private realm of a particular community. This public irrelevance is 
magnified when we focus particularly on issues of public policy, given that laws in 
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our constitutional configuration must have a non-religious, secular rationale. 
While valid in certain respects, such claims often suffer from a severe case of 
moral myopia. This historical influence of ideas drawn from the formative 
religious traditions of our culture is undeniable, and along with other moral 
traditions, continue to shape that common ground we are so anxious to find for 
public discourse. In a democratic society, religious communities themselves 
constitute various "publics," constituencies that need to be taken into account in 
policymaking. In such a society, religious communities and their members have 
not only a right but a responsibility of citizenship to participate in such discussions, 
though as "citizens," participants from religious communities are no less required 
to seek a moral vocabulary that is accessible by fellow citizens (at least, if they want 
to entertain ideas of persuading others to a different position). 
Finally, in focusing above on certain "ultimate" questions embedded in the 
debate over euthanasia, I have intended to suggest the presence of a deeply 
religious core to the debate. The questions of control and empowerment, the finite 
nature of the self, the dependency and gifted nature of human life, the place of pain 
and suffering, and the moral and existential significance of death are common, 
human questions, but also ones that historically have been vital to the moral 
dialogue of religious communities. While in a pluralistic society, we may not agree 
with the answers such traditions present on the issue of legalized euthanasia, the 
ultimate questions they raise are unavoidable for believer and nonbeliever alike. 
References 
I. Ron Hamel, ed., Active Eutluznasia, Religion, and the Public Debate (Chicago: The Park 
Ridge Center, 1991),80-90. 
2. Lisa Sowle Cahill, "A 'Natural Law' Reconsideration of Euthanasia," Linacre Quarterly 44 
(February 1977),47-63; Daniel C. Maguire, DeaJh By Choice (New York: Schocken Books), 1975. 
3. Gilbert Meilaender, "Euthanasia and Christian Vision," in On Moral Medicine: Theological 
Perspectives in Medical Ethics, Stephen E. Lammers and Allen Verhey, eds. (Grand Rapids, M1: 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1987),454-60; Hessel Bouma, Allen Verhey el ai, Christian Faith, HetJlth 
and Medical Practice (Grand Rapids, M1: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1989),290-303. 
4. Courtney S. Campbell, "Sovereignty, Stewardship, and the Self: Religious Perspectives on 
Euthanasia," (forthcoming); Ron Hamel, ed., Active Eutluznasia, Religion, and the Public Debate, 
45-77. 
5. Ron Lesko, "New Suicide-Machine Deaths Sparks Praise, Condemnation," The Oregonian 
(October 25, 1991). 
6. James F. Childress, Moral Responsibility in Conflicts (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1982),66-67. 
7. Albert Camus, The Plague (New York: Vintage Books, 1972),204-217. 
8. Ronald E. Cranford, "Helga Wanglie's Ventilator," Hastings Center Report 21:4 (July-
August 1991),23-24; Lisa Belkin, "Hospital Seeks Approval to Turn OfILife Support System," The 
Oregonian (January 14, 1991), A3. 
9. Paul J . van der Maas, Johannes J.M. van Delden, Loes Pijnenborg, Caspar W.N. Looman, 
"Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life," The Lancet 338 (September 
14, 1991),669-674. 
10. Tad Bartimus, "Promise Puts Man at Risk in Colorado," The Oregonian (August 19, 1991), 
A3. 
11. Thomas H. Murray, "Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers," Hastings Center Report 
17:2 (April 1987), 30-38. 
November, 1992 27 
12. David M. Holley, "Voluntary Death, Property Rights, and the Gift of Life," Joll17llll of 
Religious Edtics 17 (Spring 1989), 103-21. 
13. Eric J. Cassell, "I'he Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, " New England Joll17llll 
of Medicine 306 (1982), 639-645. 
14. Albert Camus, The PliJgue, 119. 
15. William F, May, The Patient's Ordeal (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991). 
16. John M. Cooper, "Greek Philosophers on Euthanasia and Suicide," in Suicide and 
EuJJuznosia.. HistoricoJ and Q)1IIempOrary Themes, Baruch A. Brody, ed. (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Press, 1989),9. 
17. Margaret Pabst Battin, ''The Least Worst Death, " Hastings Ce1ller Report 13:2 (April 1983), 
13-16. 
28 Linacre Quarterly 
